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Criminal Procedure. State v. Smith, 243 A.3d 1045 (R.I.
2021). A trial justice has the duty to thoroughly inquire into what
evidence the defendant intends to present before deciding to grant
or deny them a chance to present an opening statement. This is an
automatic duty; it is not triggered by the defendant, but rather, the
burden is always on the trial justice to ask multiple questions until
they have enough information to make this decision.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In August 2013, the FBI seized a “significant cache” of child
pornography in Peoria, Arizona.1 After determining the pornography was distributed via email to people across the country, the FBI
began an extensive investigation to unearth who the recipients
were.2 Multiple search warrants served on Craigslist, Google, and
Cox Communications exposed an email and IP address belonging to
the defendant, Mr. Andrew Smith of Cranston, as one of the recipients.3
Smith was tried for one count of possession of child pornography and appeared pro se at his trial in 2017.4 The day before the
start of the trial, the trial justice met with Smith and the prosecutor
to explain how the trial would proceed.5 At the meeting, the justice
asked Smith if he was planning on testifying and stated, “You don’t
have any witnesses you’re going to call, right?”6 Smith responded
he did not think he would testify and that he would not be calling
any witnesses of his own.7 In response, the trial judge said, “What
I’m going to do is, I’m going to let the State open, but if you don’t

Id.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Smith, 243 A.3d 1045, 1047 (R.I. 2021).
Id.
Id. at 1047–48.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Id. Smith intended to call the same witnesses the state planned to call.
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have any evidence, I’m going to instruct—and, by the way, you will
get a copy of the instructions along with [the state].”8 The record is
devoid of any further discussion about opening statements before
the trial.9
The following day, after the state delivered its opening statement, Smith also attempted to deliver an opening statement.10 The
trial justice denied Smith the opportunity to give an opening statement, stating they had “talked about this yesterday” and Smith had
to “wait until it [was his] time to make a case.”11 Smith attempted
to raise his objection again a few hours later during a break in the
state’s first witness testimony, only to be told by the trial justice
“[i]f you made it known to me yesterday that you were going to testify . . . I would have allowed you an opening statement.”12 Smith
sought clarification by asking “If I don’t testify, I can’t make an
opening statement?”13 The trial justice responded, “That’s correct.”14
Smith appealed his conviction on three grounds: the trial justice wrongly prevented him from delivering an opening statement;
the trial justice misinformed the jury that the parties had stipulated the images in question met the definition of child pornography; and the findings from the search warrant should have been
suppressed because the officer who signed the warrant was not authorized to do so.15 Only his first argument, the trial justice
wrongly prevented him from delivering an opening statement, was
considered by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Supreme Court’s primary concern was whether or not
Smith was improperly denied a chance to make an opening statement.16 Under Rule 26.2 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a defendant is allowed to make an opening statement
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 1048 & n.4.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
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“either before the state introduces its evidence or before a defendant presents his own case.”17 However, Rule 26.2 does not allow a
defendant to speak about whatever they desire.18 A defendant’s
opening statement must be limited in scope to a “summation of the
evidence that the parties intend to introduce,” including evidence
from the defendant’s case-in-chief argument and the state’s argument.19 This limited scope means a defendant may be denied a
chance to make an opening statement if they fail to specify what
evidence they will present in their own defense or what affirmative
evidence they expect to obtain on cross-examination.20 In defining
affirmative evidence that could be elicited on cross, the Court held
that evidence exposing missing elements of a charge against the
defendant qualified.21 For example, in the current case, evidence
or testimony brought out on cross determining that the photographs alleged by the state to be child pornography were actually
not child pornography could be considered affirmative evidence.22
The Court affirmed that whether a defendant has stated with
certainty what evidence they will present or expect to uncover is a
decision that must be made by trial justices.23 Citing its 2016 State
v. Martinez decision,24 the Court noted that when a defendant
would like to make an opening statement but has not stated with
certainty what evidence they will discuss, a trial justice must further inquire with the defendant to determine what evidence they
expect to solicit.25 Such questioning allows the trial justice to learn
the full scope of the defendant’s defense, and gives the justice reasonable grounds to make a decision regarding if the defendant is
entitled to an opening statement.26
The state attempted to argue Martinez held the defendant
must “attempt” to offer specific evidence before the trial justice’s

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id; see also R.I. SUPER. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
Smith, 243 A.3d at 1049.
Id. (quoting State v. Martinez, 139 A.3d 550, 554 (R.I. 2016)).
Id.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
Martinez, 139 A.3d at 554.
Smith, 243 A.3d at 1049; see Martinez, 139 A.3d at 555.
Smith, 243 A.3d at 1050.
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duty to inquire is triggered.27 The Court clarified that while a defendant should attempt to state precisely what evidence he will use
or elicit on cross, a defendant who fails to be precise “must be given
an opportunity to provide a more detailed explanation of such evidence before he is precluded from making an opening statement.”28
In other words, a trial justice must always further inquire into what
evidence a defendant expects to uncover when a defendant has not
been specific enough in their statements before a trial justice can
deny a defendant an opportunity to make an opening statement.29
In the case at bar, the Court found the trial justice did not engage in such an inquiry.30 In the pre-trial conference, the trial justice asked Smith, “You don’t have any witnesses you’re going to call,
right?”31 The Court ruled this was not a sufficient inquiry, as it did
not give Smith the opportunity to provide “a more detailed explanation of what evidence, if any, he anticipated eliciting,” on cross.32
Additionally, Smith was never asked at the pre-trial conference if
he wanted to present an opening statement; rather, Smith was
simply asked if he intended to testify or call any witnesses.33 These
two questions did not uncover what evidence Smith planned to present; therefore, the trial justice was under the legal duty to ask additional questions.34 Further questioning would have given Smith
an adequate opportunity to explain the theory of his defense and
would have given the trial justice the necessary basis to determine
if Smith could offer an opening statement.35
Since the Court vacated the conviction based on Smith’s first
argument, they did not consider Smith’s other two arguments.36
Standing as the lone dissenter, Justice Goldberg focused extensively on Smith’s disruptive behavior throughout the trial and argued the majority wrongly interpreted Martinez.37
Justice
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1052 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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Goldberg pointed out that Smith interrupted the trial justice so often throughout the proceeding that he received a contempt warning.38 Smith also tested the trial justice’s patience with “uncontrollable” outbursts in front of the jury and inappropriate questioning
on cross examination.39 Given his behavior, Justice Goldberg found
“[q]uite understandably, the trial justice was wary as to what defendant would do or say in front of the jury.”40
Justice Goldberg then stressed that a defendant has no absolute right to make an opening statement; rather, a defendant has
the burden to persuade the court they qualify to give an opening
statement by pointing to specific, affirmative evidence they intend
to uncover on cross-examination.41 In her view, Martinez does not
place an automatic duty on a trial justice to inquire into this specific
evidence.42 The duty is triggered only if the defendant offers up
proof regarding the information they intend to elicit on cross-examination.43 In this instance, Smith never offered to the justice what
evidence, if any, he intended to produce on cross.44 Smith also specifically said he was not going to call witnesses or testify in the
case.45 The lack of information from Smith meant the trial justices
duty to inquire was not triggered; therefore, the trial justice did not
err in denying Smith an opening statement.46 Justice Goldberg
ended her dissent by stating due to Smith’s behavior, the trial justice was under no obligation to discover what evidence Smith intended to elicit on cross.47
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance
and depth of the justice’s fact-finding duties in this decision. Justice Goldberg in her dissent wrote, “The trial justice could not, nor
was he under any obligation to, divine what evidence defendant
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1052–53 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1053 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1054 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1055 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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intended to elicit through cross-examination.”48 “[C]ould not” is a
strong statement; it implies there was no hope, and the trial justice
exhausted all efforts to understand what evidence Smith planned
on presenting in trial.49 The record shows the trial justice asked
two questions—one phrased initially a statement, and neither
hinted to Smith the answers could deny him an opening statement.50 The majority correctly realized that there was room for the
trial justice to further inquire with Smith. It does not appear this
is a hefty burden to place on the justices; it is simply asking them
to be thorough in their fact-finding duties before the trial begins.
Given in this case the trial justice made a bare-minimum inquiry,
a few more questions might have been enough to reach the necessary threshold. Without being inconvenient, the Court has found a
way to make sure trial justices dig a bit deeper into all the evidence
before making a trial-altering decision such as denying a defendant
an opening statement.
Additionally, further inquiry from the trial justice would help
the trial as a whole run smoother. Further questioning would have
determined if Smith was entitled to an opening statement, given
the trial justice and the state insight into where Smith was going
with his questioning, and forced Smith to think in-depth about the
questions and responses he wanted to elicit during cross. This could
have prevented some of the outbursts and off-the-rail questioning
that occurred during the trial. The entire process could have gone
more seamlessly if the justice took the time to ask these additional
questions.
By spending a good portion of her dissent discussing Smith’s
outbursts and difficulty as a pro se party,51 Justice Goldberg’s opinion reads more as a critique on a demanding defendant than a difference in law. Her disagreement with the majority’s interpretation
of Martinez is lost between paragraphs detailing the “remarkable
degree of patience” from the trial judge52 and the erratic behavior
of the defendant.53
Undoubtably, Smith’s behavior was

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1055 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1052–53 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1052 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1052–53 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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challenging; however, this should not be enough to deny him the
right to an opening statement. Justice Goldberg states, “Irrespective of his pro se status, defendant was ‘expected to familiarize himself with the law as well as the rules of procedure.’ As such, it was
incumbent upon defendant to request a sidebar conference and set
forth the affirmative evidence he planned to present.”54 While this
is true, pro se parties are often more difficult to work with and often
do require a more thorough consideration from a trial judge in order
to achieve equal justice. A defense attorney in a criminal case ensures the defendant has a fair trial by holding the state to their
burden and works as a check on the entire judicial system. When a
defendant chooses not to have an attorney present, that check on
the system is missing, at which point the judge must be extra careful to fulfill his or her neutral obligations. In this decision, the majority simply asks judges to inquire in depth what defense the pro
se party will present at trial before deciding if the defendant is entitled to an opening statement. This seems like a fair, low-burdensome method to ensure that all defendants receive equal justice as
they would in cases where an attorney is present.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court expanded off their previous
holding in Martinez by establishing a trial justice has a duty to complete a thorough investigation into a defendant’s evidence, including testimony or any evidence a defendant wishes to elicit on cross
examination, before denying a defendant the opportunity to present
an opening statement. The trial justice must inquire about the evidence regardless of how non-specific the defendant answers initially, as a defendant must be given a chance to provide a detailed
explanation of their evidence before they are prevented from giving
an opening statement.
Katriina Rose Juntunen

54. Id. at 1055 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).

